

Message Text

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SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS: POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS, AUGUST 26, 1975

(SALT TWO-749)

1. MIRV DEFINITION: ROWNY SAID (TO TRUSOV, A-977) THAT THE TWO SIDES SEEMED TO BE SAYING SAME THING WITH RESPECT TO MIRV DEFINITIONS, BUT THAT BOTH SIDE'S DEFINITIONS APPEARED UNDULY COMPLICATED. TRUSOV AGREED THAT THE DEFINITIONS WERE UNDULY LONG, AND ADDED THAT SOVIET DEFINITION WAS LONG BECAUSE IT ATTEMPTED TO COVER QUESTIONS ASKED BY US EXPERTS. HE SAID IT WAS EASY TO VISUALIZE WHAT A MIRV WAS. HOWEVER, THE SIDES SEEMED TO BE GOING TO UNDUE LENGTHS TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT MRV'S AS OPPOSED TO MIRV'S, WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE 1320 LIMITATION. ROWNY SAID THAT TO HIM THERE WERE ONLY THREE ELEMENTS OF A SATISFACTORY DEFINITION: (1) THAT A BALLISTIC MISSILE CONTAINED TWO OR MORE REENTRY VEHICLES, (2) THAT THESE REENTRY VEHICLES COULD BE

TARGETED TO SEPARATE AIM POINTS, AND (3) THAT THE AIM POINTS NEED HAVE

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NO PARTICULAR RELATIONSHIP TO ONE ANOTHER. TRUSOV SAID THAT HE WOULD

LIKE TO THINK ABOUT IT AND ASKED ROWNY IF HE COULD BE MORE PRECISE. ROWNY HANDED OVER THE FOLLOWING DEFINITION WITH THE UNDERSTANDING IT WAS AN INFORMAL PROPOSAL:

"A MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY-TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLE (MIRV) SYSTEM IS A SYSTEM CONTAINING TWO OR MORE REENTRY VEHICLES WHICH CAN BE TARGETED FROM A SINGLE BALLISTIC MISSILE TO SEPARATE AIM POINTS, THE LOCATIONS OF WHICH HAVE NO PARTICULAR RELATIONSHIP ONE TO THE OTHER."

TRUSOV SAID THAT HIS IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WITH THE DEFINITION WAS THAT IT TALKED ABOUT A MIRV SYSTEM AND THAT THE SOVIETS HAD YET TO DEVELOP A DEFINITION FOR A MIRV. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD NEVERTHELESS STUDY THE DEFINITION, BUT THAT TOWNY WAS NOT TO INTERPRET THIS AS A COMMITMENT OF ANY KIND.

2. TEST AND TRAINING AND SPACE LAUNCHERS: SMOLIN SAID (TO GRAHAM, A-978) THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE IDEA OF "WHEREVER LOCATED" AS APPLIED TO OPERATIONAL ICBM LAUNCHERS. ARTICLE VII 2(B), WHICH WAS A CARRY-OVER FROM THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, ABSOLUTELY PROHIBITED THE LOCATION OF OPERATIONAL LAUNCHERS AT TEST RANGES. HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE REVERSE CONCEPT, THAT IS, TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS "WHEREVER LOCATED" WOULD STILL BE TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS AS ONE COULD HAVE TEST OR TRAINING LAUNCHERS AT OPERATIONAL SITES.

3. SHCHUKIN ASKED (MAY, A980) WHAT CONSTITUTED AN OPERATIONAL SILO LAUNCHER. MAY STATED THAT SUCH THINGS AS OPERATIONAL READINESS, PRESENCE OF AN ARMED MISSILE, AND INCLUSION IN AN OPERATIONAL PLAN, WERE SOME OF THE INDICES TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. SHCHUKIN ASKED IF THE U.S. INTENDED TO COUNT ANY OF THE LAUNCHERS AT TEST SITES UNDER THE AGGREGATE LIMITATION? MAY ANSWERED THAT HE WAS NOT PERSONALLY SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE SITUATION AT THE SOVIET TEST SITES TO ANSWER THE QUESTION BUT THAT THE U.S. INTENT WAS NOT TO COUNT UNDER THE AGGREGATE LAUNCHERS USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR TEST AND TRAINING. SHCHUKIN NOTED THAT THE PRESENCE OF AN ARMED MISSILE AND MEANS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL WERE AMONG THE THINGS NECESSARY FOR A MISSILE LAUNCHER TO BE OPERATIONAL. MAY SAID THAT THE JUDGMENT OF WHETHER THE MISSILE LAUNCHER WERE OPERATIONAL WOULD BE BASED ON A VARIETY OF INFORMATION GATHERED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. SHCHUKIN NOTED FURTHER THAT MISSILE LAUNCHERS WHICH HAD THE

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EXTERNAL APPEARANCE OF OPERATIONAL LAUNCHERS HAD TO BE USED FOR TESTS AND WERE PRESENT AT TEST SITES. WOULD SUCH LAUNCHERS BE JUDGED BY THE U.S. TO BE OPERATIONAL SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THEIR EXTERNAL SIMILARITY WITH OPERATIONAL LAUNCHERS? MAY SAID NO, EXTERNAL SIMILARITY WOULD NOT, IN HIS VIEW, BE THE SOLE CRITERION. BOTH MAY AND SCHUKIN AGREED THAT FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE "OPERATIONAL" WOULD BE HELPFUL.

4. KARPOV SAID (TO EARLE/GRAHAM, A-978), WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF ITS NEW PROPOSAL, THE U.S. HAD CONFUSED THE USE OF THE WORD "OPERATIONAL". IN ARTICLE VI, DEALING WITH WYSTEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE, "OPERATIONAL" WAS USED IN CONTRADISTINCTION TO "IN THE FINAL STAGE OF CONSTRUCTION," "IN RESERVE," ETC., WHEREAS IN ARTICLE VII, "OPERATIONAL" WAS USED TO DIFFERENTIATE FROM TEST AND TRAINING OR SPACE PURPOSES. WHAT, DID THE UNITED STATES MEAN BY "OPERATIONAL"?

5. KARPOV ALSO SAID THAT THE U.S. HAD COMPOUNDED EXISTING PROBLEMS BY DELETING ANY REFERENCE TO SPACE LAUNCHERS. WERE THE SIDES NOT AGREED THAT NEITHER SPACE LAUNCHERS NOR TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS SHOULD BE USED TO CIRCUMBENT THE AGREEMENT? EARLE AND GRAHAM ASKED WHETHER WHAT THE SOVIETS REALLY WERE INTERESTED IN WAS NOT MERELY A PROVISION THAT SPACE LAUNCHERS COULD NOT BE CONVERTED TO ICBM LAUNCHERS. KARPOV AND SMOLIN IMPLIED THAT PERHAPS THAT WAS THE CASE. JOHNSON

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